Wormhole attack is a severe attack in mobile ad hoc networks, which is particularly challenging to defend against. In this paper, a new method defined as time ruler using distance measurement for detecting wormhole attack is proposed including its hypothetical model, the concept of time ruler and the process of its establishment, storage and calibration. The feasibility of the method on theory, thus respectively deriving two discriminating inequalities with the use of sending time ruler and receiving time ruler are analyzed in detail. The performances of the method are also analyzed and its validity is evaluated with Omnet++ developing tools.
INTRODUCTION
Mobile Ad Hoc networks (MANETs) are self-organized, multi-hop wireless networks which are independent of fixed infrastructure, with the advantages of easy networking and not being limited with time and space. Unlike the conventional network, MANETs are characterized by numerous constraints such as lack of infrastructure, lack of resources on nodes, dynamic topology, no centralized management and control, and lack of pre-established trust relationships between nodes. Due to these, MANETs are very likely to often be run in untrusted environments and make themselves vulnerable to various security attacks, such as eavesdropping, tamper, replay, and denial-of-service.
Wormhole attack is also called Tunnel attack. In MANETs, a malicious node records a packet, at one location in the network, tunnels the packet to another location, and replays it there. If the tunneled distance is longer than the normal wireless transmission range of a single hop, it takes less time or less hops to make the tunneled packet arrive sooner than other packets transmitted over a normal multihop route. In this case, it creates the illusion that two remote regions of a MANET are directly connected through nodes that appear to be neighbors. Since it costs less hops to travel through tunnel than by a normal route, for shortest path routing protocol, the malicious node increases its attraction to network flow, and thereby providing advantageous conditions for itself to launch further attack such as tamper or packet-loss.
As to most routing protocols for Ad Hoc networks that exist such as AODV, DSR, DSDV, none of them are capable of defending against wormhole attack. There already exist some detecting and defending methods of wormhole attack, such as: Packet Leash, employing specialized hardware devices such as GPS [1] , directional antennas [2] , connectivity information approach based on visual network topology [3] , and inserting new protocol to the nodes such as adding EnergyWatcher and TrustManager on the node [4] . These methods require accurate and fast calculation of nodes or high hardware equipment cost. And there were still many discussions on secure routing protocols against wormhole attack in the literatures recently [5] , [6] .
In fact, compared to normal single-hop link, the time that the pretended one through tunnel needs is much longer. Therefore, if normal nodes in the network can detect their single-hop distance from their neighbors, then they can detect this kind of tunneled links pretended to be single-hop, thus rejecting such malicious nodes around. The existing methods based on timing analysis can be divided into synchronous and asynchronous methods. The synchronous method requires the nodes to have tightly synchronized clocks but the drawbacks of the asynchronous methods is that they need to verify the vicinity of each neighbor by exchange instant and cooperated information from neighbors [7] . In this paper, we propose a new asynchronous method that does not have the drawbacks of the previous methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces a detecting method of wormhole attack based on time ruler with its hypothetical model. Section III analyses in detail the feasibility of the method on theory. Section IV offers the network performance results related to wormhole attack level in the circumstances that the method of timer ruler is applied to the networks suffering wormhole attack, and then verifies the effectiveness of this method. Finally, conclusion is given.
II. TIME RULER AND ITS ESTABLISHMENT, STORAGE AND

CALIBRATION
For the convenience to define time ruler, we make the following assumptions:
(1) Every wireless transceiver of normal node i is provided with the same transmission radius () R i R  .
(2) The network at least includes two malicious nodes, which are tunneled through wireless high-bandwidth channel out of band .We assume that malicious nodes won't join in the whole Ad Hoc network until all the other nodes have accomplished the job of initialization.
(3) Modified SAODV is applied to all the nodes. In addition to the original encryption of routing packets, we also encrypt the message of HELLO. Besides, some fields are inserted into HELLO for the use of setting time.
International Workshop on Cloud Computing and Information Security (CCIS 2013) (4) The first routing packet sent is HELLO packet with affiliated information that is called HELLO_INFO. Any node is required to reply HELLO packet as an acknowledgement when it receives HELLO_INFO. Apart from the functions defined in AODV, HELLO_INFO and HELLO_ACK are mainly set for the established of time ruler. (5) Each node has its own timing system .Time provided in different systems may not be exactly the same.
Every node sends routing packets in accordance with a certain rule. To be specific, they often send at the calculable time point with predetermined minimum intervals between two successive transmissions. The proposed concept of time ruler contains three elements: starting time to send routing packet 0 T , minimum interval between two successive transmissions t G , allowed transmission range in one 
III. BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR DETECTING WORMHOLE
ATTACK WITH TIME RULER After all the neighboring nodes of Ad Hoc network have linked together, they must send routing packets following its already designed time ruler. Each receiving node decides whether the route of packet is valid or not according to receiving time ruler of the sender (learned from routing packets).The receiving moment of routing packet ought to be predictable if the distance between the sender and the receiver is variable but not further than the transmission radius since packets are transmitted with specific intervals. Generally, the effective neighbors and wormhole attack can be detected by the sending time ruler or receiving time ruler.
A. Finding effective neighbors with sending time ruler
Nodes in the Ad Hoc can enter or leave at any time. The node will first broadcast one-hop message of HELLO to establish its direct links with others when it joins in the Ad Hoc network. All the routing messages including HELLO are required to send in accordance with sending time ruler.
In Fig.1 , node S detects valid neighbors by the means of checking other nodes with replied HELLO_ACK. In the coverage range of node S exists normal node A and malicious node M1 while the normal node X covers normal node B and malicious node M2. The gap between M1and M2 that is longer than any radius of all the nodes is tunneled by wireless high-bandwidth channel out of band.
Assumed that the distance between S and X is longer than the transmission radius () RS of node S, and also exclude the delay of the routing messages on the node, the HELLO_ACK message sent by node X and node A will reach at different time. This message reaches node X through the tunnel between M1 and M2 after it arrives at node A by normal channels. However it can't get to node B due to its short life span of only one hop. Node A and X will answer with HELLO_ACK immediately or after several delays of t G , so the time points that node A and X receive HELLO_INFO can be obtained as follows:
Supposed that node S is within the coverage of node A and M1, then the time points of node S that receives HELLO_ACK from node A and node X are Generally speaking, When these nodes send messages is unknown, the deviations of arrival time are usually obtained by taking the remainder of t G .The time difference from sending HELLO_INFO to receiving HELLO_ACK by node S to A and X are 0 () 
IV. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
We use Omnet++4.1 network simulator to simulate and implement this detecting method of wormhole attack based on time ruler. In the simulated network, 50 nodes, including 5 source nodes and 5 malicious nodes, are distributed randomly in a 2000×2000 m 2 two-dimensional ground. The transmission range of all normal nodes is a circular area with the radius of 323 m, while the maximum length of tunnel between malicious nodes could be more than 1000 m. All nodes move with the speed of 1～10m/s in a random but limited-moving model, which means that they first choose a direction in the range of 360 degrees before moving, then move a fixed distance in a constant velocity. After reaching the destination, they rest for a while and change to another random direction, and again move a fixed distance in a certain speed. The routing protocol of SAODV is applied to all the normal nodes, and wormhole malicious nodes use the same model as normal nodes. The tunnel will be built if the distance between malicious nodes is greater than their transmission range R, but shorter than the tunnel's maximum length, otherwise, the tunnel building fails. Malicious node won't send data or routing messages on its own initiative, but instead just forward routing messages from other nodes and discard data messages. Normal nodes will isolate them as soon as they detect attack ones. In this way, the detection of malicious nodes can help reduce loss rate of data packets. Fig.4 shows the relationship between loss rate of network packets and node mobility before and after using the method of time ruler detection. When this method is not applied (curve I), the loss rate is about 35%, and40% at most, while afterwards, it reduces a lot. While the loss rate is around 12.5～25% if the time ruler has an interval t G 6 times of T  (curve II), it will decrease to 11～20% when the interval adds to 12 times of T  (curve III).What's more, in the case of the same node mobility, the latter's loss rate is always a little smaller, which indicates that the time ruler whose interval is longer will have lower loss rate, and obviously better performance of the entire network.
In addition, two phenomena shown after application of this method need further explanation.
First, when nodes have constant speed, the time ruler with longer intervals results in better network performance, which is consistent with analysis above. Precisely, as to normal nodes with fixed transmission range, its probability to detect illegal link is related to the interval t G .When the time ruler applied in the network suffering wormhole attack possessed a larger value of t G ,the probability to discover wormhole will increase, thus more wormholes will be detected and isolated by normal nodes. Second, concerning a time ruler with constant interval t G , the network performance improves in the wake of increase in the speed of nodes. As a whole, in a certain period, when nodes speed up, every normal node can get direct contact with more other nodes, therefore establishing more receiving time rulers. When the number of receiving time ruler established boosts, the probability to discover wormhole will Node mobility (m/s) Packet loss rate of network Figure 4 . Wormhole simulation increase, thus more wormholes will be detected and isolated by normal nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ad Hoc network, wormhole attack is more difficult to defend against. As to wormhole attack building tunnels on the channel out of band, it is characterized by its length that is much longer than single-hop of normal nodes. Therefore, the tunnel can be detected as long as the length of the single-hop link is obtained. Since the propagation speed of messages between nodes is determined, measuring the propagation time of the message can reach the purpose of measuring length of the link.
